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Abstract
As a green port and shipping-related policy, the vessel speed reduction incentive program
(VSRIP) involves using a subsidy to induce ships to reduce their speed in a port area so
that the emissions can be reduced at the port. However, this program may attract new
ships to visit the port because of the subsidy; in this case, the port’s profit will grow
due to more ship visits, but its total emissions may also increase, which is counter to the
original intention of the subsidy. The government could then intervene by providing part
of the subsidy for the VSRIP or by collecting air emission taxes for the increased emission
at the port. This paper studies how to design suitable subsidies for ships participating
in a VSRIP. Two bilevel subsidy design models are formulated based on a Stackelberg
game to maximize the port’s profit (related to the profits from original and new ships, the
subsidy provided by the port, and air emission taxes) and to minimize the government’s
cost (related to the damage cost of air emissions, the subsidy provided by the government,
and air emission taxes). We determine which policy (including a sharing subsidy policy,
no government intervention, and an air emission tax policy) should be implemented by
the government in different cases and how much subsidy should be provided by the port
under each government policy. We find that these decisions are affected by several practical
factors, such as the damage cost of air emissions per ton of fuel and the subsidy sensitivities
of original and new ships. We also outline several meaningful insights based on the analysis
of these practical factors.
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1. Introduction
A subsidy program adopted by a port may lead to an increase in air pollution even if
it appears to be environmentally friendly. Hence, effective government intervention to mit-
igate the negative influence or promote the positive influence of the program is essential.
This paper considers a subsidy program aimed at green environmental protection in ship-
ping, which is used to demonstrate a methodology for the design of suitable government
intervention policies and for the determination of the program’s subsidies under different
policies to deliver economic and environmental benefits for both the ports and society (Du
et al., 2015).
Green environmental protection in the shipping industry to reduce emissions has be-
come an increasing concern recently. Shipping emissions are dependent on fuel consump-
tion. The Third International Maritime Organization Greenhouse Gas Study (IMO, 2014)
showed that global fuel consumption by ships was estimated to be around 300 million tons
per year. Ships emit considerable amounts of gases and particulates from their operations,
including nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon dioxide (CO2), and particu-
late matter (PM), and 70% of shipping emissions occur within 400 km of the coast, which
may cause a severe environmental problem and damage human health. Many environmen-
tal regulations for different industries have been presented and widely discussed (Ančić and
Šestan, 2015; Esenduran et al., 2015; Svindland, 2018), and various measures have been
adopted to reduce shipping emissions, among which slow steaming has received signifi-
cant attention (Kontovas and Psaraftis, 2011; Woo and Moon, 2014; Yin et al., 2014; Lee
et al., 2015; Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2015; Cariou et al., 2019; Psaraftis, 2019). Although
Psaraftis and Kontovas (2010) and Chang and Chang (2013) pointed out that slow steam-
ing may not bring economic benefits, it remains an effective way of reducing emissions
due to the approximately cubic relationship between vessel speed and fuel consumption
(Corbett et al., 2009; Wang and Meng, 2012; Brouer et al., 2013; Lindstad et al., 2013;
Wang and Meng, 2015; Koza, 2019).
Because slow steaming can lead to lower emissions, a voluntary vessel speed reduction
program was adopted by the ports of Los Angeles (LSA) and Long Beach (LGB) in 2001. In
recent years, each of the two ports has imposed two vessel speed reduction zones (VSRZs):
a 20-nautical-mile (nm) VSRZ and a 40-nm VSRZ. A shipping line can receive dockage
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refunds if 90% or more of its ship visits (a ship visit means that a ship enters and leaves the
port once) in a calendar year comply with the 12 nm/h (knots) speed limit in the VSRZs.
At LSA, ships participating in the vessel speed reduction incentive program (VSRIP) in
the 20-nm and 40-nm VSRZs can receive refunds of 15% and 30% of their first-day dockage,
respectively. At LGB, ships participating in the 20-nm and 40-nm VSRZs can receive 15%
and 25% reduced dockage rates in the following year, respectively. According to statistics,
participation rates for the 20-nm VSRZ were 92% at LSA and 97% at LGB in 2017, and
for the 40-nm VSRZ, they were 84% at LSA and 91% at LGB (LSA, 2018; LGB, 2018).
The high rate of compliance with the VSRIP is related to the subsidy. According to the
analysis results of Ahl et al. (2017), an increase of US$100 in daily dockage savings for each
ship visit can induce a 9.27% increase in the compliance rate of mixed-cargo ships, which
indicates that the program’s financial incentives can encourage more ships to participate.
The VSRIP has been investigated and analyzed by numerous scholars (Zis et al., 2014;
Zis, 2015; Bone et al., 2016; Zhuge et al., 2020). Khan et al. (2012) reported that re-
ducing vessel speeds from cruise speed (i.e., 24 or 25 knots) to no higher than 12 knots
in VSRZs can lead to reductions in CO2 and NOx emissions of approximately 61% and
56%, respectively. Analyzing the VSRIP at LGB, Chang and Jhang (2016) assessed the
effects of speed reduction and switching to low-sulfur fuel for bulk and container ships
entering the Kaohsiung Port under two scenarios: decreasing the speed to 12 knots in a
20-nm VSRZ and decreasing it to 12 knots combined with switching to low-sulfur fuel in
the 20-nm VSRZ. Linder (2018) analyzed the effects of social pressure, regulatory pres-
sure, and economic motivations on the success of the VSRIP. Some studies have focused on
other VSRZs similar to those used at LSA and LGB. Cariou and Cheaitou (2012) argued
that setting VSRZs at European Union ports may generate more emissions on a global
scale because of the increased sailing speed of ships outside the zones. Chang and Wang
(2014) estimated SO2, NOx, and PM emissions and found that a VSRZ could reduce these
emissions by one third. López-Aparicio et al. (2017) developed a comprehensive emission
inventory for a Nordic port considering the regulation on the sulfur content of fuel and ex-
plored several mitigation measures, i.e., the implementation of onshore power for feasible
oceangoing vessels, the combination of onshore power and a VSRZ, and the use of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) by domestic ferries based on this combination. Their results showed
that onshore power can reduce emissions effectively, as compared with 2013, emissions of
NOx and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in 2020 could be reduced by up to 15% by
the measure of onshore power in combination with the VSRZ, and by up to 23% for NOx
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and 17% for CO2e with the increased use of LNG based on this combination. VSRIPs
and VSRZs have received a great deal of attention from academia, and numerous studies
have concluded that the design of VSRZs can contribute to the reduction of emissions in
local areas. However, few studies have considered that the VSRIP may attract new ships,
resulting in additional air emissions, which may decrease the effectiveness of the VSRIP’s
emission reduction near the port.
Governments play a central role in reducing shipping emissions. Collecting emission tax
is a common government intervention measure (Wang and Chen, 2017; Ding et al., 2020;
Haehl and Spinler, 2020). Wang and Xu (2015) and Wang et al. (2018) analyzed different
carbon tax forms and demonstrated that carbon tax is effective in controlling shipping
emissions. The government may also provide subsidies for the construction of green ports
and the development of green shipping. Dai et al. (2019) and Wu and Wang (2020) studied
how to offer subsidies for promoting investment in shore power and its use. Subsidies can
also accelerate fleet replacement so that ship emissions can be reduced (Zheng and Chen,
2018; Yang et al., 2019).
Based on the existing research, our paper investigates how to design a fixed subsidy for
every visit of a ship participating in the program at a port, considering new ships attracted
by the VSRIP, and introduces two government policies: a sharing subsidy policy, i.e., the
government provides part of subsidy for the program, and an air emission tax policy, i.e.,
the government collects taxes on the increased air emissions from new ships visiting the
port. In this paper, the emissions are mainly NOx, SO2, CO2, and PM. Note that in our
study, the fixed subsidy per ship visit is assumed to be no higher than the profit obtained
from each ship visit to guarantee that the total profit of the port is positive. We study this
problem in a one-week period because liner ships usually have a weekly service frequency. A
base case without considering the VSRIP at the port (Case 0) is first presented. Our study
then considers three main cases: the VSRIP is adopted without government intervention
(Case 1), the VSRIP is adopted with the sharing subsidy policy (Case 2), and the VSRIP
is adopted with the air emission tax policy (Case 3). The models in Cases 2 and 3 are
proposed using a Stackelberg game. The subsidy of the VSRIP can be provided by the port
and the government. To differentiate the source of the subsidy, we abbreviate the subsidy
offered by the government to “government subsidy,” and that by the port to “port subsidy.”
The subsidy from the VSRIP, that is, the sum of the government and port subsidies, is
abbreviated to “program subsidy.” The program and port subsidies are identical in Cases
1 and 3. The total profit at the port is abbreviated to “port profit,” that is, the profit from
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original ships in Case 0, the total profit from original and new ships minus the port subsidy
in Cases 1 and 2, and the total profit minus the port subsidy and the air emission taxes in
Case 3, as shown in Table 1. We use “government cost” in the study to denote the total
damage cost of air emissions in the VSRZ in Cases 0 and 1, the sum of the total damage
cost and government subsidy in Case 2, and the total damage cost minus air emission taxes
in Case 3 (see Table 2).
Table 1: Constructs of port profit under different cases
Terms
Case 0 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
No VSRIP
Normal VSRIP Sharing subsidy policy Air emission tax policy
(without government (subsidy shared by (tax collected by
intervention) government) government)
Profit from original ships + + + +
Profit from new ships + + +
Port subsidy − − −
Air emission taxes −
Note: “+” means that the term in the corresponding row is included in the port profit of the case in the corresponding
column and leads to an increase in the port profit, and “−” means that the term in the corresponding row is included
in the port profit and leads to a decrease in the port profit.
Table 2: Constructs of government cost under different cases
Terms Case 0 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Damage cost of air emissions + + + +
Government subsidy +
Air emission taxes −
Our paper investigates the following research questions: 1) Which policy should the
government implement to minimize its cost? How much subsidy should the port give for
each ship visit to maximize its profit under the government’s policy? How many ships
will participate in the program given the fixed subsidy per ship visit? 2) How will several
important factors, including the damage cost of air emissions per ton of fuel and the subsidy
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sensitivities of the original and new ships, affect the port profit, the government cost, and
the number of ships complying with the rules of the VSRIP?
Three notable findings emerge from our study. 1) For each assumption in the decision
function of shipping companies regarding whether to participate in the subsidy program
(i.e., linear, convex or concave functions of the number of ships participating in the VSRIP
with the program subsidy per ship visit), there are two thresholds of the total change in
fuel consumption as a function of the unit subsidy provided for each ship visit: a negative
threshold and zero. The optimal decisions for the government are the sharing subsidy
policy, no government intervention, and the air emission tax policy when the total change
in fuel consumption per unit subsidy for each ship visit is less than the negative threshold,
between the two thresholds, and greater than zero, respectively. The port will always adopt
the program, and the program subsidy per ship visit varies under different government
policies. It is interesting that the subsidy provided by the port for each ship visit is identical
when the sharing subsidy policy is implemented or when government intervention is not
included. The numbers of original and new ships that participate in the VSRIP are closely
related to the program subsidy. 2) The numbers of original and new ships participating in
the VSRIP without government intervention increase under the sharing subsidy policy and
decrease under the air emission tax policy. The change in the port profit is as follows: the
port can always obtain more profit from the VSRIP, and the sharing subsidy policy will
further increase its profit, while the air emission tax policy will reduce the increase in profit
from the VSRIP. The change in the government cost after the adoption of the VSRIP is as
follows: when the total change in fuel consumption per unit subsidy provided for each ship
visit is negative, the government can reduce its cost by applying the program; when it is less
than the negative threshold, the government can further reduce its cost by implementing
a sharing subsidy policy; and when it is positive, the government will implement the air
emission tax policy to reduce its cost, as otherwise, the government cost in this case will be
higher than that without the VSRIP. 3) Several practical factors will affect the decisions
of the government and the port, including the damage cost of air emissions per ton of
fuel and the subsidy sensitivities of original and new ships. Note that the values of two
important indexes mentioned above, i.e., the total change in fuel consumption per unit
subsidy for each ship visit and the negative threshold, are dependent on these factors. Our
study suggests that to make wise decisions on intervention policies, the government should
evaluate the two indexes by collecting data on these important factors. Using the results of
the sensitivity analysis, the port can estimate the effectiveness of the VSRIP in attracting
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new ships and improving its profit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes one model of the
port profit and two bilevel Stackelberg game models of the port profit and the government
cost under different government policies, and analyzes the equilibrium solution for each
player (the government or port). Section 3 examines the effects of the damage cost of
air emissions per ton of fuel and the subsidy sensitivities of original and new ships. In
Section 4, we investigate two new assumptions on the function of the number of ships
participating in the VSRIP. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Subsidy design
This paper analyzes a subsidy design problem of the VSRIP at a port under several
government policies. The VSRIP sets a VSRZ with an upper speed limit (e.g., 12 knots).
The shape of the VSRZ is similar to a sector with the port as the center of a circle with
a fixed radius (e.g., 20 nm). The visit of a ship that follows the speed limit rule in the
VSRZ is eligible for a fixed subsidy, which does not exceed the profit that can be obtained
from each ship visit. Ships that reduce their sailing speed in the VSRZ will contribute to
the reduction of air emissions near the port. However, some new ships attracted by the
program will cause extra air emissions. Recall that the damage cost of air emissions is
the major term of government cost. Therefore, our paper takes into account two common
government policies (i.e., a sharing subsidy policy and an air emission tax policy) to reduce
government cost, where the sharing subsidy policy can reduce air emissions by attracting
more ships to comply with the rules in the program and the government can increase its
tax revenue and limit the number of new ships via the air emission tax policy. We study
one case without the VSRIP and three cases in which the program is adopted during a
one-week period. The aims of the port and the government are to maximize profit and
minimize cost, respectively. The shipping companies decide on the number of original and
new ships participating in the VSRIP as a function of the program subsidy per ship visit.
2.1. Case 0: No VSRIP
We first analyze the original profit at the port (called the port profit) and the damage
cost of air emissions in the VSRZ (called the government cost) without the VSRIP. We
take into account all service charges from ships at the port. We define the average service
charge for each ship visit as r and the average variable cost for each ship visit as cvar, and
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we do not consider the fixed cost of serving ships by the port since it has no effect on the
design of the subsidies in the program. Therefore, the average profit p obtained from each
ship visit can be calculated as p = r − cvar. We also define the number of original ships
visiting the port without the VSRIP as Q0, the fuel consumption per ship visit in the VSRZ
for the ships not participating in the program as f1, and the damage cost of air emissions
resulting from emitting one ton of fuel as c. The port profit Π0 and the government cost
C0 are then
Π0 = pQ0 (1)
and
C0 = cf1Q0. (2)
2.2. Case 1: No government intervention
The VSRIP is a voluntary program. We consider that the number of original ships
visiting the port, i.e., Q0, will not change after the program is adopted, and that some
of them (denoted by Q̂(x)) may participate in the program. Referring to Maglaras and
Meissner (2006), Adida and DeMiguel (2011), Luo et al. (2012), Chen and Liu (2016),
Dong et al. (2016), and Cho and Wang (2017), we assume a linear relationship between
Q̂(x) and the program subsidy per ship visit x with subsidy sensitivity a1:
Q̂(x) = a1x. (3)
We define x ≤ p < Q0/a1 because the program subsidy cannot be larger than the profit
per ship visit p, and getting all of the original ships to participate in the program may
be difficult even if the program subsidy is significantly high. Moreover, it is common
for adjacent ports to compete with each other (such as Hong Kong and Shenzhen ports,
Singapore and Tanjung Pelepas ports, and Los Angeles and Long Beach ports), and a port
may therefore attract more ships when it reduces its charge per ship visit by providing
program subsidies. All new ships will participate in the VSRIP to receive the subsidy.
The number of new ships, denoted by Q̃(x), is related to the subsidy per ship visit in the
VSRIP, which can be expressed as
Q̃(x) = a2x, (4)
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where a2 is the subsidy sensitivity of new ships. Suppose that a1 > a2 > 0, i.e., the subsidy
sensitivity of the original ships is greater than that of the new ships because the sailing
routes and schedules of the original ships have fewer changes than those of the new ships
participating in the VSRIP, which means that it is usually more convenient or beneficial
for the original ships to participate in the program.
The port aims to maximize its total profit considering the profit from all ships, including
original and new ships minus the total program subsidy:
[M1] max
x
Π1(x) = p(Q0 + Q̃(x))− x(Q̂(x) + Q̃(x)) (5)
subject to (3), (4) and
0 ≤ x ≤ p. (6)
The first- and second-order derivatives of Π1(x) are
dΠ1(x)
dx




= −2(a1 + a2) < 0, (8)
meaning that Π1(x) is a concave function in x. The optimal solution can be obtained when







which lies between 0 and p.
The numbers of original ships and new ships from different shipping companies partic-














Plugging x∗1 into objective function (5), the maximum port profit can be expressed as





Eq. (12) shows that the port profit will increase, i.e., Π∗1 > Π0, after the adoption of the
VSRIP since the profit from new ships is higher than the total port subsidy.
The local government is concerned about the damage cost of air emissions from the
incoming and outgoing ships in the VSRZ. We define f2 as the fuel consumption per ship
visit in the VSRZ for the ships participating in the VSRIP. We have f1 > f2 because a ship
not following the rules of the program has a higher sailing speed and consumes more fuel.
According to the average profit from each liner ship visit at ports and the damage cost
of air emissions, we assume that p > cf1 > cf2 and p > 2cf2. The government cost C
∗
1 ,
i.e., the total damage cost of air emissions from original and new ships, with the designed
program subsidy per ship visit x∗1 is
C∗1 = cf1(Q0 − Q̂∗1) + cf2(Q̂∗1 + Q̃∗1)
= cf1Q0 + c [f2(a1 + a2)− f1a1]x∗1
= cf1Q0 +
a2p · c [f2(a1 + a2)− f1a1]
2(a1 + a2)
. (13)
Define A as the total change in fuel consumption caused by the per-unit subsidy provided
for each ship visit:
A = f2(a1 + a2)− f1a1, (14)
which must be less than a2p/2c because f1 > f2 and p > 2cf2. Note that A can have a
positive or negative value in our study. If fuel consumption increases, then A > 0; if fuel
consumption decreases, then A < 0. The VSRIP may attract a large number of new ships
to visit the port, or it may not be attractive (i.e., the subsidy sensitivity of new ships a2 is
insignificant) for many reasons. For example, there may be no other ports near the port
with the VSRIP, making it difficult to entice ships that always berth at other ports to visit
this port; alternatively, some ships may have signed contracts with other ports that offer a
lower service charge. It is evident that if A ≤ 0, which may occur when new ships are not
sensitive to the subsidy or when the upper speed limit in the VSRZ is very low, the total
damage cost will decrease after the VSRIP is adopted, i.e., C∗1 ≤ C0; otherwise, the total
damage cost will increase, i.e., C∗1 > C0.
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2.3. Case 2: Sharing subsidy policy
Two policies can be adopted to reduce the government cost. The first policy is that the
local government intervenes in the VSRIP by sharing a certain proportion of the program
subsidy (denoted by t) for each ship visit. If t = 1, the port will set the program subsidy
as high as possible until no new ships will be attracted by the program, which will result
in a significant increase in the government cost. Therefore, the government will not pay a
full subsidy for the VSRIP. The government cost C2(t) consists of the total damage cost of
air emissions and the government subsidy, and the port profit Π2(t, x) is calculated as the
profit from all ships minus the port subsidy. The introduction of a sharing subsidy policy
guarantees that the government cost can be reduced after the adoption of the VSRIP. We
present a bilevel Stackelberg game model [M2] to minimize the government cost at the
upper level and to maximize the port profit at the lower level:
[M2] min
t
C2(t) = cf1(Q0 − a1x∗2) + cf2(a1x∗2 + a2x∗2) + tx∗2(a1x∗2 + a2x∗2) (15)
subject to C2(t) ≤ C∗1 (16)





Π2(t, x) = p(Q0 + Q̃(x))− (1− t)x(Q̂(x) + Q̃(x)) (18)
subject to (3), (4) and
0 < t < 1 (19)
0 ≤ x ≤ p. (20)
The government is the leader and can forecast the response of the port (the follower)
for a given proportion of the program subsidy offered by the government. Based on the
response of the port, the government can make the best decision for the shared proportion
of the program subsidy to minimize the government cost. Hence, we analyze the lower level
of model [M2] first and focus on Π2(t, x), which is also a concave function in x. When the
first partial derivative of Π2(t, x) in x is 0, we can obtain the optimal program subsidy per
ship visit x∗2 on t:
x∗2 =
a2p
2(1− t)(a1 + a2)
. (21)
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The government cost model with x∗2 is
C2(t̃) = cf1Q0 +
a2
2p2 · t̃2 + 2cA · a2p · t̃− a22p2 · t̃
4(a1 + a2)
. (23)
It is easy to prove that C2(t̃) is convex in t̃. The optimal solution t̃
∗ can be obtained when










Only when A < −a2p/2c is t∗ within its domain. Here, A < −a2p/2c means that a
unit increase in program subsidy per ship visit will lead to a decrease in the total fuel
consumption of more than a2p/2c units, which could be a result of a low subsidy sensitivity





It is inferred that x∗2 > [a2(p − 2cf2)]/[4(a1 + a2)] > 0 and x∗2 < 3pa1/[4(a1 + a2)] < p.
Therefore, x∗2 is always within its domain.
Proposition 1. If A < −a2p/2c, the government will intervene in the VSRIP by providing
subsidy t∗x∗2 for each ship visit, and the port will provide (1− t∗)x∗2 = x∗1 for each ship visit;
otherwise, the government will not provide a subsidy for the VSRIP, but the port will still
provide x∗1 for each ship visit.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We find that the optimal solutions for the port subsidy per ship visit is identical under
no government intervention (Case 1) and under the sharing subsidy policy (Case 2). The
maximum port profit in Case 1 can be obtained at x∗1, which indicates that the port subsidy
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will increase faster than the profit from new ships when the port subsidy per ship visit is
greater than x∗1, and this relationship between the port subsidy and the profit from new
ships will not change when the government subsidy is introduced in Case 2. Therefore, the
optimal port subsidy per ship visit in Case 2 is still x∗1. The phenomenon that the port
will provide the same amount of subsidy per ship visit (i.e., x∗1) in Cases 1 and 2 can also
be explained as follows: 1) there is a quadratic term of the port subsidy per ship visit in
the port profit functions in Cases 1 and 2; 2) the first-order derivative of the port profit
function with the port subsidy per ship visit in Case 1 is proportional (1/(1− t) times) to
that in Case 2, the proof of which is shown in Appendix C; 3) we can derive that both
Π1(x) and Π2(t, x̃) are concave functions of the port subsidy per ship visit, and hence, the
maximum port profits in the two cases can be obtained when the first-order derivatives of
their profit functions with the port subsidy per ship visit are equal to 0.
According to Proposition 1, the sharing subsidy policy will be enforced only when
A < −a2p/2c. Therefore, based on the decisions of the port and the government, we can
determine that when A < −a2p/2c, the numbers of original ships and new ships attracted












and the minimum government cost and the maximum port profit are









Proposition 2. When A < −a2p/2c, we have C∗2 < C∗1 < C0 and Π∗2 > Π∗1 > Π0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
We have explained the rationality of the relationships between C∗1 and C0 and between









in Proposition 2 are also reasonable for the following reason. When A < −a2p/2c, the
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government can reduce its cost (i.e., C∗2 < C
∗
1 ) by sharing a part of the program subsidy
per ship visit (i.e., t∗x∗2) since the decreased damage cost of air emissions is greater than the
increased government subsidy, and the port will also benefit from government intervention
(i.e., Π∗2 > Π
∗
1).
2.4. Case 3: Air emission tax policy
The second policy is that the government will collect taxes on the air emissions which
increase after the adoption of the VSRIP, that is, a fixed tax s for the increased air emissions
from one ton of fuel. Hence, the total air emission tax S is
S =
{
0 if A ≤ 0,
sxA if 0 < A < a2p2c .
(31)
When A ≤ 0, the port does not need to pay any air emission tax. The optimal port
subsidy will still be x∗1. Therefore, we focus on the case of A > 0 in this section. Recall that
A < a2p/2c because f1 > f2 and p > 2cf2. C3(s) is the government cost function, including
the total damage cost of air emissions minus the total air emission tax. Π3(s, x) is the port
profit function considering the port subsidy and air emission taxes. We propose another
bilevel Stackelberg game model [M3], where the aim of the upper level is to minimize the
government cost and the target of the lower level is to maximize the port profit:
[M3] min
s
C3(s) = cf1(Q0 − a1x∗3) + cf2(a1x∗3 + a2x∗3)− sx∗3A (32)
subject to C3(s) ≤ C∗1 (33)





Π3(s, x) = p(Q0 + Q̃(x))− x(Q̂(x) + Q̃(x))− S (35)
subject to (3), (4) and
s ≥ 0 (36)
0 ≤ x ≤ p. (37)
The government is still the leader and determines the tax by predicting the response




solution to Π3(s, x). When x = x
∗
3, the first partial derivative is equal to 0. Therefore, x
∗
3





Plugging x∗3 into C3(s), we obtain




which is a convex function in s. The optimal air emission tax s∗ can be obtained by letting











It is easy to show that 0 < x∗3 < p.
Considering the optimal program subsidy, Q̂∗3 original ships and Q̃
∗











The minimum government cost and the maximum port profit are









Proposition 3. When 0 < A < a2p/2c, we have C
∗







Proof. See Appendix E.
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In this section, focusing on the case of 0 < A < a2p/2c, the government will enact an
air emission tax policy to minimize its cost, where the tax must be sufficiently large to
guarantee that the government cost of Case 3 will not exceed that of Case 0; otherwise,
the government will increase the tax. Based on this policy, the port aims to maximize its
total profit by designing an optimal program subsidy for the VSRIP, and the program will
be cancelled if it cannot improve the total profit. Note that the increased profit related to
the VSRIP will decrease due to the air emission tax policy. We can achieve an equilibrium
between the two players in which the tax revenue received by the government is higher
than the increased damage cost of air emissions and the port’s profit from new ships is
higher than the air emission tax and the total port subsidy. Therefore, the government
cost in Case 3 will be lower than that in Case 0 (i.e., C∗3 < C0), and the port profit in Case
3 will be lower than that in Case 1 (i.e., Π∗3 < Π
∗
1) but still higher than that in Case 0 (i.e.,
Π∗3 > Π0) in the equilibrium state.
The decisions and effects of the government policy and program subsidy are summarized
in Table 3. We observe a surprising result: there exists an interval of A without government
intervention between two intervals with different intervention policies. The reason may lie
in the different concerns of the two government intervention policies. The sharing subsidy
policy is relevant to the numbers of original and new ships following the rules of the VSRIP,
and the air emission taxes are dependent on the increase in air emissions. In addition, when
−a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0, meaning that the decrease in the total fuel consumption is significantly
small for each unit increase of the program subsidy per ship visit, the government subsidy
cannot be offset by the decreased damage cost of air emissions, and hence, the contribution
of the VSRIP to the reduction in the damage cost is insufficient to motivate the government
to provide a subsidy. For simplification of expression, we define





































In this section, we examine the impacts of the damage cost of air emissions from one
ton of fuel and the subsidy sensitivities of original and new ships on the decisions made by
the shipping companies, the maximum port profit, and the minimum government cost.
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Table 3: The decisions and effects of government policy and program subsidy




≤ A ≤ 0 0 < A < a2p
2c
Optimal government policy Sharing subsidy policy No intervention Air emission tax policy












1in the VSRIP comparison







1in the VSRIP comparison
Port profit comparison Π∗2 > Π
∗
1 > Π0 Π
∗





Government cost comparison C∗2 < C
∗
1 < C0 C
∗
1 ≤ C0 C∗3 < C0 < C∗1
3.1. Effects of the damage cost of air emissions per ton of fuel
The value of the damage cost c of air emissions per ton of fuel is related to several factors,
including population density near the port, wind direction, and fuel quality. Eqs. (10) and
(11) show that c has no effect on the numbers of original and new ships that will participate
in the VSRIP when there is no government intervention. Referring to the optimal policy in
each interval of A, as shown in Table 3, we see that when c grows, the shipping companies
will increase the numbers of original and new ships participating in the program if the
government shares the subsidy, and they will reduce these numbers if the government
collects air emission taxes, which can be easily derived from Eqs. (27), (28), (42), and
(43). The reasons for the above findings are as follows. The shipping companies determine
participation depending on the optimal program subsidy per ship visit x∗ when we analyze
the effect of c. We observe that x∗ will not change, will rise, and will fall with the increase
of c when the government does not intervene, offers a subsidy, and collects air emission
taxes, respectively, and the number of ships participating in the program will have the
same change tendency with c.
As shown in Table 4, whether the values of two first-order derivatives dC∗2/dc and
dC∗1/dc in c are greater than 0 cannot be estimated directly, which requires further analysis,
and we obtain dC∗2/dc > 0 and dC
∗
1/dc > 0 by the results in Appendix F. Therefore, as
shown in Table 4, we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 4. The impacts of c on Π∗ and C∗ are as follows: 1) when A < −a2p/2c,
Π∗2 will increase in c; when −a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0, a change in c will not affect Π∗1; when
0 < A < a2p/2c, Π
∗
3 will decrease in c; 2) C
∗ will increase in c within each interval of A.
To interpret the results of Proposition 4, we focus on the terms of each Π∗ and C∗ with an
increase in c as follows. When A < −a2p/2c, the government will provide a larger subsidy
per ship visit, but the port subsidy per ship visit will not change; hence, the numbers
of original and new ships participating in the program will increase. The added profit
is greater than the increased subsidy at the port, so the total profit Π∗2 will rise. When
−a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0, the port profit will not be affected by c because c is not included in any
term of Π∗1. When 0 < A < a2p/2c, the tax per ship visit will increase, and the program
subsidy per ship visit will decrease, leading to a reduction in the numbers of the two types
of ships following the rules of the program. Then, the profit from new ships will shrink,
and the reduced profit will become greater than the total reduced subsidy and tax provided
by the port. Therefore, the total profit Π∗3 will decrease. In addition, as the total damage
cost of air emissions is a major term of C∗, it makes sense that the increase of c will always
result in an expansion of C∗, even if the government can adjust the subsidy and the tax to
find a new equilibrium when A < −a2p/2c and 0 < A < a2p/2c, respectively.
Table 4: Impact of c on Π∗ and C∗















≤ A ≤ 0 0 f1Q0 + a2pA2(a1+a2) > 0
[∗]








Notes: 1) “> 0” or “< 0” is shown after a first-order derivative
if its value is always positive or negative, respectively, with the
increase of c. 2) “[∗]” is shown as a right superscript of “> 0” if
the value interval of a first-order derivative is greater than 0 but
cannot be estimated directly. 3) “ dΠ
∗
dc
” is the first-order derivative
of Π∗ in c, and “ dC
∗
dc
” is the first-order derivative of C∗ in c.
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3.2. Effects of the subsidy sensitivities of original and new ships
We now analyze the impacts of the subsidy sensitivities of original and new ships (i.e.,
a1 and a2) on the numbers of the two types of ships participating in the program (i.e., Q̂
∗
and Q̃∗) using the related first-order derivatives. Based on the findings in Tables 5 and 6,
we present Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The impacts of a1 on Q̂
∗, a1 on Q̃
∗, a2 on Q̂
∗, and a2 on Q̃
∗ are as
follows: 1) an increase in a1 or a2 will lead to a larger Q̂
∗ or Q̃∗, respectively, during each
domain of A; 2) Q̃∗ will decrease in a1 and Q̂
∗ will increase in a2 when −a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0
or 0 < A < a2p/2c; 3) when A < −a2p/2c, the monotonicity of Q̃∗ in a1 and that of Q̂∗
in a2 are opposite, dependent on the relationship between 2cf1 and p (i.e., if p > 2cf1, Q̂
∗
will increase with a2 and Q̃
∗ will decrease with a1; if p = 2cf1, Q̂
∗ and Q̃∗ are constant
with the change of a2 and a1, respectively; otherwise, Q̂
∗ will decrease with a2 and Q̃
∗ will
increase with a1).
It should be noted that the change in Q̃∗ with a1 is determined by the relationship between
x∗ and a1, and the increase or decrease in Q̂
∗ and x∗ with a2 is identical, while the
monotonicity of Q̂∗ in a1 and Q̃
∗ in a2 may be different from the monotonicity of x
∗ in a1
and x∗ in a2.
Table 5: Impact of a1 on Q̂
∗ and Q̃∗























0 < A < a2p
2c







Notes: 1) “a1” is defined as
f2a2
f1−f2
and “a1” is defined as
a2p+2cf2a2
2c(f1−f2)




first-order derivative of Q̂∗ in a1, and “
dQ̃∗
da1
” is the first-order derivative of Q̃∗ in a1.
The changes in the maximum port profit Π∗ and the minimum government cost C∗
with a1 in each interval of A are shown in Table 7. Summarizing the results in Table 7
yields Proposition 6.
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Table 6: Impact of a2 on Q̂
∗ and Q̃∗































Notes: 1) “a2” is defined as
2c(f1−f2)a1
p+2cf2
and “a2” is defined as
(f1−f2)a1
f2




the first-order derivative of Q̂∗ in a2, and “
dQ̃∗
da2
” is the first-order derivative of Q̃∗ in
a2.
Proposition 6. The impacts of a1 on Π
∗ and C∗ are as follows: 1) when A < −a2p/2c,
the monotonicity of Π∗2 in a1 is related to the relationship between 2cf1 and p (i.e., Π
∗
2
will increase with a1 if 2cf1 > p, a1 has no effect on Π
∗
2 if 2cf1 = p, and otherwise
Π∗2 will decrease with a1), and an increase in a1 will cause a decrease in C
∗
2 ; 2) when
−a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0, an increase of a1 will cause a decrease of Π∗1 and C∗1 simultaneously;




3 in a1 are
related to their corresponding parameter values.
The findings in Proposition 6 make practical sense. A look at Eqs. (25), (26), (27), and
(28) reveals that when a1 increases after a1 (see Table 7), the government subsidy per ship
visit will increase and the port subsidy per ship visit will decrease, and the total number
of ships participating in the VSRIP will increase. The added government subsidy is less
than the reduced damage cost of air emissions, leading to a decrease in the government
cost, and the change in the port profit cannot be determined, as the changes in the port
subsidy and the profit from new ships are relevant to the corresponding parameter values.
When −a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0, an increase in a1 will result in a decrease in the program subsidy
per ship visit; the number of original ships participating in the program will then increase
and the number of new ships attracted by the program will decrease, but the total number
of ships in the program will not change. Comparing the reduced profit from new ships
and the decreased port subsidy and considering the reduction in the damage cost of air
emissions, we conclude that both Π∗1 and C
∗
1 will decrease. When 0 < A < a2p/2c, the
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Therefore, Π∗3 is a convex function and C
∗
3 is a concave function in a1, and there may exist
three change tendencies of Π∗3 with an increase in a1 (i.e., decrease, decrease first and then
increase, or increase) and C∗3 with a1 (i.e., increase, increase first and then decrease, or
decrease), as shown in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively. We conclude that with an increase in
a1, the tax per ship visit will increase, the program subsidy per ship visit will decrease,
and the total number of ships attracted by the VSRIP will increase with the increase in
the number of original ships and the decrease in the number of new ships. However, since
we cannot compare the first-order derivatives of its terms, the monotonicity of the port
profit (the government cost) in a1 cannot be derived, which can also be confirmed by Fig. 1
(Fig. 2).
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: Three change tendencies of Π∗3 with the increase of a1
Table 8 reports the first-order derivatives of Π∗ and C∗ in a2 within each interval. We
summarize the results of this table in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The impacts of a2 on Π





all increasing monotonically in a2 in the related intervals of A; 2) when A < −a2p/2c or
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Three change tendencies of C∗3 with the increase of a1
Table 7: Impact of a1 on Π
∗ and C∗
























0 < A < a2p
2c





Notes: 1) See Table 5 for the definitions of a1 and a1. 2) “
dΠ∗
da1
” is the first-order derivative
of Π∗ in a1, and “
dC∗
da1
” is the first-order derivative of C∗ in a1.
−a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0, C∗ may or may not increase in a2; when 0 < A < a2p/2c, C∗3 will
decrease in a2.
For the first part of Proposition 7, a reasonable explanation is that an increase in a2 means
a unit of program subsidy can attract more new ships, which may contribute to a rise
in profit from the new ships that is a major component of the port profit. Although the
equilibrium will change with the upturn of a2 in each of the three intervals, the port profit
will finally increase after changes in several terms. In the intervals of −a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0
















The two second-order derivatives show that C∗1 is a convex function in a2 and C
∗
2 is a
concave function in a2. Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the possible relationships between C
∗
1 and
a2 and between C
∗
2 and a2, respectively. When A < −a2p/2c, an increase in a2 will lead
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Three change tendencies of C∗1 with the increase of a2
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Three change tendencies of C∗2 with the increase of a2
to a reduction in the government subsidy per ship visit and to a rise in the number of
new ships and in the total number of ships participating in the program, but we cannot
further derive the change in the damage cost of air emissions. Hence, we cannot explain
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the change in C∗2 with a2. When −a2p/2c ≤ A ≤ 0, if a2 grows, the program subsidy per
ship visit and the numbers of original and new ships following the rules in the VSRIP will
all increase, meaning that the air emissions from the original ships will decrease and the
air emissions from the new ships will increase, but whether the change in the amount of
air emissions from the original ships will be more than that from the new ships cannot be
inferred, and therefore the change in C∗1 with a2 also cannot be assessed. In addition, when
0 < A < a2p/2c, we observe that with the increase of a2, the tax per ship visit will decrease,
the program subsidy per ship visit will grow, and the numbers of the original and new ships
attracted by the VSRIP will increase. We also obtain that the added damage cost of air
emissions is less than the increased tax, and hence C∗3 is decreasing monotonically in a2.
Table 8: Impact of a2 on Π
∗ and C∗






























Notes: 1) See Table 6 for the definitions of a2 and a2. 2) “
dΠ∗
da2




the first-order derivative of C∗ in a2.
4. Discussion on function of number of ships participating in the VSRIP
We have assumed a linear relationship between the number of original or new ships
participating in the VSRIP and the program subsidy per ship visit. Considering the lack
of research on the decision process of shipping companies to participate in the subsidy
program, we change this assumption in this section and analyze two new assumptions:
(i) a linear relationship between the number of original or new ships participating in the
program and the square of the program subsidy per ship visit (i.e., a convex function Q̂(x)
or Q̃(x) in x), and (ii) a linear relationship between the number of original or new ships
participating in the program and the square root of the program subsidy per ship visit (i.e.,
a concave function Q̂(x) or Q̃(x) in x).
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For Assumption (i), we construct the following functions on the numbers of original






Constraints (51) and (52) will replace Constraints (3) and (4) in models [M1], [M2], and
[M3], and the objective functions of the three models should also be modified by the two
new constraints. Based on the properties of these models, we can derive their optimal
solutions as shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Optimal solutions of models [M1], [M2] and [M3] with Assumption (i)




≤ A ≤ 0 0 < A < a2p
2c
Optimal government policy Sharing subsidy policy No intervention Air emission tax policy










Proportion of program subsidy
t∗ = −a2p−3cA
2a2p−3cA N.A. N.A.provided by the government
Fixed tax for air emissions
N.A. N.A. s∗ = a2p+2cA
3A
from per ton fuel increased
after adopting VSRIP










81(a1+a2)2participating in the VSRIP










81(a1+a2)2participating in the VSRIP
Maximum port profit Π∗2 = pQ0 +
4a2p(2a2p−3cA)2
243(a1+a2)2




Π∗3 = pQ0 +
32(a2p−cA)3
729(a1+a2)2
Minimum government cost C∗2 = cf1Q0 − 4(2a2p−3cA)
3
729(a1+a2)2
C∗1 = cf1Q0 +
4cA·a22p2
9(a1+a2)2
C∗3 = cf1Q0 − 16(a2p−cA)
3
243(a1+a2)2









Table 10 reports the optimal solutions of the three models.
Table 10: Optimal solutions of models [M1], [M2] and [M3] with Assumption (ii)




≤ A ≤ 0 0 < A < a2p
2c
Optimal government policy Sharing subsidy policy No intervention Air emission tax policy










Proportion of program subsidy
t∗ = −2a2p−3cA
a2p−3cA N.A. N.A.provided by the government
Fixed tax for air emissions
N.A. N.A. s∗ = 2a2p+cA
3A
from per ton fuel increased
after adopting VSRIP
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Tables 9 and 10 indicate that the optimal solutions of models [M1], [M2], and [M3] as
well as the negative threshold of A vary according to the assumption made regarding the
number of ships participating in the program. For Assumption (i) or (ii), there still exist
three intervals of A (i.e., less than the negative threshold, between the two thresholds,
and greater than zero) where the sharing subsidy policy, no government intervention, and
the air emission tax policy will be implemented, and the results of the comparison of the
numbers of original and new ships participating in the VSRIP, the port profit, and the
government cost under different policies are unchanged (see Table 3).
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5. Conclusions
We have analyzed a subsidy design problem based on a Stackelberg game, taking into
account new ships attracted by the VSRIP and government policies. For each assumption
made regarding the number of ships participating in the program, we found that the total
change in fuel consumption caused by the unit subsidy provided for each ship visit has
two important thresholds: a negative threshold related to parameter values, and zero.
When the total change in fuel consumption per unit subsidy provided for each ship visit
is less than the negative threshold, the government should enforce the sharing subsidy
policy; when it is between the negative threshold and zero, the government should not
intervene in the VSRIP; and when it is greater than zero, the optimal decision for the
government is the air emission tax policy. For each government policy, the port will adopt
the VSRIP and design a different program subsidy per ship visit. An interesting finding
is that the port subsidy per ship visit is the same when the sharing subsidy policy is
implemented or when the government does not intervene in the VSRIP. Shipping companies
will determine their participation rate in the program based on the subsidy provided. The
two important indexes (the total change in fuel consumption per unit subsidy for each
ship visit and the negative threshold) are determined by several practical factors, such as
the damage cost of air emissions per ton of fuel and the subsidy sensitivities of original
and new ships. The government should estimate the two indexes in the decision-making
process for intervention policies using the values of these factors, and the port can obtain
some managerial implications from a sensitivity analysis of several factors. For example,
we observe that the port profit increases with the increased subsidy sensitivity of new ships
when the total change in fuel consumption per unit subsidy for each ship visit is greater
than zero, and hence, a port with more adjacent ports that could lead to a higher subsidy
sensitivity of new ships may be better suited to adopt the VSRIP; we also observe that
the higher subsidy sensitivity of original ships may lead to fewer new ships, meaning that
a port with a higher subsidy sensitivity of original ships may have difficulty improving its
profit through the program.
We summarize the performance of the subsidy program as follows. When the VSRIP
is adopted, some original and new ships will participate in the program, the port profit
will always increase, and the government cost will decrease when the total change in fuel
consumption per unit subsidy for each ship visit is negative, and will increase when it is
positive. The numbers of original and new ships complying with the rules of the VSRIP
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(port profit, government cost) can be further increased (increased, decreased) under the
sharing subsidy policy. In contrast, the air emission tax policy can lead to a reduction in
the numbers of original and new ships participating in the program and can contribute to
decreasing government cost and port profit, so the government cost in this case is lower
than that without the VSRIP, while the port profit will still be higher than that without
the program.
Future research could examine the following two aspects. First, the amount of fuel
consumption per ship visit within the VSRZ for ships not participating in the program is
assumed to be identical in this study. We can further analyze the subsidy design problem
with various types of ships with different sailing speeds and fuel consumption functions.
Second, this paper considers only two subsidy providers. Studies involving new subsidy
sources, such as a fund from an environmental non-governmental organization, should be
of interest.
Appendix A. List of notations
Notations
a1 Subsidy sensitivity of original ships, where subsidy sensitivity is the degree
to which the number of ships participating in the VSRIP is affected by the
program subsidy per ship visit.
a2 Subsidy sensitivity of new ships, a1 > a2.
A Total change in fuel consumption caused by the per-unit program subsidy
provided for each ship visit.
c Damage cost of air emissions from consuming one ton of fuel.
f1 Fuel consumption per ship visit within the VSRZ for the ships not partici-
pating in the VSRIP.
f2 Fuel consumption per ship visit within the VSRZ for the ships participating
in the VSRIP, f1 > f2.
p Profit obtained from each ship visit.
s Fixed tax for the air emissions from one ton of fuel that are increased after
the adoption of the VSRIP in Case 3.
s∗ Optimal fixed tax for the air emissions from one ton of fuel that are increased
after the adoption of the VSRIP in Case 3.
28
S Total fixed tax for the air emissions increased after the adoption of the VSRIP
in Case 3.
t Proportion of program subsidy per ship visit provided by the government in
Case 2.
t∗ Optimal proportion of program subsidy per ship visit provided by the gov-
ernment in Case 2.
x Program subsidy per ship visit.
x∗1 Optimal program subsidy per ship visit in Case 1.
x∗2 Optimal program subsidy per ship visit in Case 2.
x∗3 Optimal program subsidy per ship visit in Case 3.
C0 Government cost in Case 0.
C∗1 Government cost in Case 1.
C2(t) Government cost function in Case 2.
C∗2 Minimum government cost in Case 2.
C3(s) Government cost function in Case 3.
C∗3 Minimum government cost in Case 3.
Π0 Port profit in Case 0.
Π1(x) Port profit function in Case 1.
Π∗1 Maximum port profit in Case 1.
Π2(t, x) Port profit function in Case 2.
Π∗2 Maximum port profit in Case 2.
Π3(s, x) Port profit function in Case 3.
Π∗3 Maximum port profit in Case 3.
Q0 Number of original ships visiting the port without the VSRIP.
Q̂(x) Function of the number of original ships participating in the VSRIP.
Q̃(x) Function of the number of new ships participating in the VSRIP.
Q̂∗1 Optimal number of original ships participating in the VSRIP in Case 1.
Q̃∗1 Optimal number of new ships participating in the VSRIP in Case 1.
Q̂∗2 Optimal number of original ships participating in the VSRIP in Case 2.
Q̃∗2 Optimal number of new ships participating in the VSRIP in Case 2.
Q̂∗3 Optimal number of original ships participating in the VSRIP in Case 3.
Q̃∗3 Optimal number of new ships participating in the VSRIP in Case 3.
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. When A < −a2p/2c, the optimal proportion of program subsidy per ship visit
offered by the government t∗ is between 0 and 1, and the optimal program subsidy per
ship visit x∗2 is between 0 and p. Hence, the government and the port will provide t
∗x∗2 =
(−a2p − 2cA)/[4(a1 + a2)] and (1 − t∗)x∗2 = a2p/[2(a1 + a2)] = x∗1 for each ship visit,
respectively. When −a2p/2c ≤ A < a2p/2c, the optimal shared proportion of program
subsidy t∗ will be no greater than 0, and therefore the government can minimize its cost
by setting t = 0, meaning the government will not intervene in the program. The port will
design the optimal program subsidy per ship visit as x∗1 (see Section 2.2).
Appendix C. Proof on the relationship between the first-order derivative of
port profit function in Case 1 and that in Case 2
Proof. In Case 1, we have analyzed in section 2.2 that the first-order derivative of Π1(x)
is a2p− 2(a1 + a2)x. In Case 2, t is in its domain only when A < −a2p/2c. We rearrange
Π2(t, x) by introducing a new variable x̃ = (1− t)x that is the port subsidy per ship visit,
and we have
Π2(t, x̃) = pQ0 + a2p ·
1
1− t














Therefore, the first-order derivative of Π2(t, x̃) with the port subsidy per ship visit is
1/(1 − t) times that of Π1(x). Recall that both x in Π1(x) and x̃ in Π2(t, x̃) are port
subsidies per ship visit.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. When A < −a2p/2c, the difference between C∗2 and C∗1 is C∗2 − C∗1 = −(a2p +






2−Π∗1 = −a2p(a2p + 2cA)/
[8(a1+a2)] > 0. We have C
∗
1 < C0 when A < −a2p/2c based on the analysis in Section 2.2,
and the inequality Π∗1 > Π0 is straightforward. Therefore, this proposition can be obtained
by reorganizing the mentioned inequalities.
30
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. These inequalities can be proved easily by referring to the proof of Proposition 2.






When A < −a2p/2c, as Q0 > a1p, we derive the first-order derivative of the minimum






> f1 · a1p +











2(2p− cf1) + 3a2p · f1a1 + a2p · f2(a1 + a2)
]
> 0. (F.1)






> f1 · a1p +
a2p · f2
2
− a2p · f1a1
2(a1 + a2)
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